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QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
IN THE BELGIAN FIGHT AGAINST COVID-19
Toon Moonen*
suMMAry: i. Introduction. II. Fundamental rights: confinement measures. 
III. Democratic control: special powers. IV. Federalism: consultation and 
coordination. V. Conclusion.
I. introduction
As anywhere else, Belgium recently witnessed the outbreak of  a virus the like 
of  which the world had not seen in a long time.1 When the epicenter of  the 
crisis moved to Europe, Belgium was not spared. On 30 June 2020, a total 
of  61,427 cases of  COVID-19 had been reported. 17,759 people had been 
hospitalized while 9,747 patients had died.2 Measures to fight the crisis and its 
consequences took many forms, including legally. In this overview, the focus 
is on three constitutionally relevant concerns: (II) confinement measures and 
*  Professor at ConstitUGent, the center for research and education on constitutional law 
at Ghent University; attorney at the Brussels bar.
1  An earlier version of  this overview, co-authored with J. Riemslagh, was published 
on Verfassungsblog and is available here: https://verfassungsblog.de/fighting-covid-19-legal-powers-
and-risks-belgium/. Elsewhere in the blogosphere, for example F. Bouhon, A. Jousten, X. 
Miny and E. Slautsky, “States’ Reactions to COVID-19 Pandemic: An Overview of  the 
Belgian Case”, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 14 April 2020, available here: http://www.iconnectblog.
com/2020/04/states-reactions-to-covid-19-pandemic-an-overview-of-the-belgian-case/; J. Clarenne 
and C. Romainville, “Le droit constitutionnel belge à l’épreuve du covid-19”, Jus Politicum 
Blog, 23 April 2020, available here: http://blog.juspoliticum.com/2020/04/23/le-droit-constitu-
tionnel-belge-a-lepreuve-du-covid-19-1-2-par-julian-clarenne-et-celine-romainville/; P. Popelier, “The 
impact of  the Covid-19 crisis on the federal dynamics in Belgium”, UACES Territorial Politics 
Blog, 5 May 2020, available here: https://uacesterrpol.wordpress.com/2020/05/05/the-impact-of-
the-covid-19-crisis-on-the-federal-dynamics-in-belgium/.
2  See the epidemiological bulletin of  30 June 2020, available here: https://covid-19.scien 
sano.be/sites/default/files/Covid19/COVID-19_Daily%20report_20200630%20-%20NL.pdf.
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their impact on fundamental rights; (III) the granting of  ‘special powers’ to 
the executive and its impact on democratic control; and (IV) the distribution 
of  powers between the federal state and the federated entities. I conclude 
that these seem to correspond to concerns raised elsewhere, even if  some 
features of  the Belgian architecture may have complicated matters more 
than necessary (V).
II. FundAMentAl riGhts: 
conFineMent MeAsures
After some hesitation when the virus reached Europe, stringent measures 
were taken to reduce new infections in Belgium. On 13 March 2020, the 
federal Minister of  the Interior declared the “federal phase” of  the national 
emergency plan. This was immediately followed by a Ministerial Decree im-
posing measures to slow down the spread of  COVID-19.3 Most cultural, rec-
reational and sportive activities were prohibited. Bars and restaurants were 
closed, as were most non-food stores and malls. Classes were cancelled, al-
though schools remained open for children without care alternatives. The 
governments of  the Communities (a form of  federated entities) adopted mea-
sures reorganizing or limiting school and youth activities, and limited physi-
cal access to care centers who work with seniors and vulnerable people.
As the virus spread, the Minister restricted those measures further. 
Physical distancing was introduced, access to super markets was regulated, 
telework for all ‘non-essential’ businesses and services was imposed. Non-es-
sential businesses and services for which telework and distancing proved im-
possible were closed. Public transportation was reorganized. Colleges and 
universities switched to distance learning. Non-essential travelling from Bel-
gium was prohibited. Note, however, that the government never imposed a 
‘lockdown’ in the strictest sense of  the word. Even at the height of  the pan-
demic, people were allowed to do basic shopping, walk or sport outdoors.
In a later stage, those measures were gradually loosened.4 Nevertheless, 
they raised multiple concerns in view of  fundamental rights. Two questions 
related to the legality principle. Firstly, it was unclear whether the (pre-ex-
3  The Ministerial Decree was based, among other grounds, on the Law of  15 
May 2007 concerning Civilian Safety, available here: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/
wet/2007/05/15/2007000663/justel.
4  The currently applicable Ministerial Decree of  30 June 2020, replacing the previ-
ous regulations, is available here: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/besluit/2020/06/30/202 
0042036/justel.
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isting) delegation of  authority to the Minister of  the Interior to adopt the 
restrictions was clear enough and whether it could allow measures of  such 
a scale in the first place. This is because in principle, limitations of  funda-
mental rights have to be adopted by the legislature, curtailing the options to 
delegate such powers to the King (i.e. the Cabinet), let alone to an individ-
ual minister, and notwithstanding that the confinement decrees were taken 
after deliberation in the full Council of  Ministers. In this respect, the Con-
stitution goes beyond what the European Convention on Human Rights re-
quires. Secondly, when police services started to enforce the measures with 
increasing intensity, it appeared that a number of  confinement measures 
lacked clarity. The Ministerial Decree, which was repeatedly amended as 
the crisis unfolded, was supplemented by online guidelines to the general 
public. Well-intended as they were, certain types of  confinement behavior 
were touted in those “FAQ”5 as legally obligatory, whereas the text of  the 
Decree provided no basis for that, leading to confusion among the public 
and within police forces. As time went on, legal certainty suffered and criti-
cism of  the unsatisfactory drafting of  the Decree and the status given to the 
FAQ increased. Some cases, to the extent people took the risk to reject a fine 
given in dubious circumstances, may still find their way to court. Finally, 
when the numbers of  new infections started to fall, unequal enforcement of  
clear violations of  the rules caused some outcry as well.
Beyond those concerns, agreement existed that the goal pursued by the 
confinement measures – protecting public health for the time the crisis lasted 
– was legitimate. The question was whether they were proportionate, nota-
bly in view of  the freedom of  movement and assembly, the right to property, 
the free exercise of  religion, the right to privacy, and the right to equality. 
Remarkably, during the first stage of  the crisis, the confinement measures 
did not cause a lot of  litigation. There seemed to be a general willingness 
to abide, or at least to not go to court, even though technically any judge 
president could have issued injunctions.6 This changed somewhat when the 
government decided to relax some confinement measures. People and busi-
nesses who could not benefit from regained freedom, whereas others could, 
argued that the equality principle was violated. Nevertheless, the Council of  
State, as the competent administrative court, accepted the Minister’s piece-
meal approach and ruled that “in light of  the urgent fight against an unseen 
5  This frequently asked questions section (which itself  changed frequently) of  the Belgian 
government’s COVID-19 website is available here: https://www.info-coronavirus.be/en/faq/.
6  More recently, at least one judge in Brussels was asked to roll back the confinement 
measures. He refused in scathing terms (as reported for example here: https://www.vrt.be/
vrtnws/nl/2020/07/03/zaak-hoeyberghs-en-co-intellectuele-armoede/).
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and most serious (international) health crisis that Belgium faces”, he could 
claim “the most discretionary powers of  appreciation”.7 Other claims (in-
cluding based on the right to free exercise of  religion) failed for procedur-
al reasons8 or were moot before the Council could decide.9 Interestingly, 
the crisis put a spotlight on science-based legislation and regulation. As the 
Minister’s measures were to a large extent driven by the advice provided 
by experts,10 their findings were also crucial for the Council of  State to as-
sess their pertinence.
III. deMocrAtic control: 
special powers
In addition to the health crisis, political leaders feared a socio-economic 
backlash. Although the Constitution does not contain an emergency clause, 
Belgian constitutional law provides an instrument called ‘special powers’ leg-
islation. Based on an expansive reading of  Article 105 of  the Constitution,11 
those allow unusually wide delegations of  legislative powers to the Cabinet. 
They typically include the power to abolish, complement, amend or replace 
laws adopted by Parliament. Special powers are remembered mostly as an 
instrument used to fight the economic and financial turmoil of  the 1980s 
and to guide Belgium into the Eurozone in the 1990s. They have not been 
properly put to use since then. As the COVID-19 crisis unfolded, they quickly 
became the center of  political attention again.
Special powers legislation needs to meet a number of  requirements. 
First, the presence of  a ‘crisis’ or ‘exceptional circumstances’ is required. 
Notably, in 2009, legislation resembling special powers was adopted to fight 
7  Council of  State 27 April 2020, n° 247.452, nv Andreas Stihl and another, available 
here: http://www.raadvanstate.be/arr.php?nr=247452.
8  Council of  State 28 May 2020, n° 247.674, Suenens and others, available here: http://
www.raadvanstate.be/arr.php?nr=247674; see also Council of  State 9 July 2020, n° 248.039, vzw 
Internationale Vakbeurs van het Meubel Brussel and another, available here: http://www.
raadvanstate.be/arr.php?nr=248039.
9  Council of  State 26 May 2020, n° 247.620, X and others, available here: http://www.
raadvanstate.be/arr.php?nr=247620.
10  The crisis measures are discussed within the National Security Council (including sev-
eral federal cabinet members), which is itself  supported by a Risk Assessment Group, a Risk 
Management Group and a scientific committee. The details about the coordination of  these 
bodies are available here: https://crisiscentrum.be/nl.
11  An English version of  the Belgian Constitution is available here: https://www.dekamer.
be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/publications/constitution/GrondwetUK.pdf.
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the H1N1-influenza outbreak.12 Second, special powers can only be granted 
for a limited period. Third, the goal and object of  the special powers have 
to be narrowly defined. Fourth, special powers legislation does not allow 
the government to violate higher norms, including the Constitution. If  spe-
cial powers touch upon matters that are constitutionally reserved for Parlia-
ment, finally, the decrees adopted in application thereof  are subject to ratifi-
cation by Parliament. It can also subject special powers to other conditions, 
such as reporting.
Special powers are to be dealt with carefully in a parliamentary democ-
racy. Until the current crisis broke, Belgium’s federated entities (Commu-
nities and Regions) had never made use of  special powers. On 17 March 
2020, however, the Parliament of  the Walloon Region granted sweeping 
special powers.13 In order to guarantee the continuity of  public services, it 
even granted powers in case it would be adjourned because of  COVID-19. 
Remarkably, the Walloon framework allowed the government to skip re-
questing legal advice from the Council of  State, which in principle is man-
datory. In the following days, the Walloon government took budgetary mea-
sures, suspended home evictions and temporarily transferred powers from 
the municipal councils to the municipal executives. At the latest one year 
from their adoption, Parliament will have to ratify those decisions. Other 
federated entities adopted special powers legislation as well.
On the federal level, granting special powers was delayed for politi-
cal reasons. Until 19 March 2020, the federal government was a caretaker 
government. This means that the first, far-reaching confinement measures 
(cf. supra) were actually taken by a caretaker Minister. Whereas a caretaker 
government’s powers are in principle limited, they include taking ‘urgent’ 
measures, so there was little doubt that the confinement rules fell within 
his power. Nevertheless, the government did not command a majority in 
Parliament. It had remained in power since the 2019 elections, following 
which the formation of  a new cabinet had failed. In light of  the country’s 
deteriorating health situation, after tumultuous negotiations, a majority of  
members of  Parliament agreed to adopt a motion of  confidence, elevating 
the Cabinet to standard operating capacities. Politically, it agreed however 
to limit itself  to dealing with the COVID-19 crisis. Minority cabinets are 
12  Law of  16 October 2009 providing powers to the King in case of  an influenza epidemic 
or pandemic, available here: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/wet/2009/10/16/2009024377/
justel. Interestingly, however, this law was adopted retroactively.
13  Federate Law of  17 March 2020 providing special powers to the Walloon government 
with regard to the COVID-19 health crisis, available here: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/
decret/2020/03/17/2020040687/justel.
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a highly unusual phenomenon in Belgian institutional history. Eventually, 
special powers bills were adopted on the federal level as well.14 The fed-
eral government, too, would be able to forego the advice of  the Council of  
State, but only for measures directed at halting the spread of  the virus. Here 
as well, all special powers decrees are subject to ratification by Parliament 
within one year of  their coming into force.
Unsurprisingly, a minority cabinet with reluctant parliamentary sup-
port which resorted to a crisis technique that had fallen into disuse caused 
skepticism. The Council of  State aired criticism with regard to the precise 
wording and delimitation of  the special powers, but accepted that this was 
a time that could warrant their use.15 On the suggestion of  the Council, 
Parliament better framed the scope of  measures that would allow tinkering 
with judicial proceedings. To somewhat compensate for the lack of  demo-
cratic support for the Cabinet, a parliamentary committee was asked to 
monitor the Cabinet’s usage of  the special powers.16 More importantly, the 
political parties who had supported the special powers set up an informal 
weekly deliberation for the core members of  the Cabinet and opposition 
party leaders. This body (for which there was no constitutional basis) em-
phasized how Belgium is, politically speaking, a partitocracy.
Given that the most urgent confinement measures were already taken 
before granting special powers and given the speed by which the (nowadays 
largely single chamber) Parliament can operate if  the need arises, it is fair 
to wonder whether the special powers, which ended on 29 June 2020, were 
necessary at all. Indeed, although a number of  measures were taken by 
special powers decree, after a couple of  weeks the Cabinet also started in-
troducing bills following the ordinary legislative procedure. To some extent, 
this was even necessary, as the special powers law restricted the Cabinet’s 
options to change tax and social security laws. At the same time, it is under-
standable that at the start of  an unprecedented crisis, the Cabinet wanted to 
14  Laws of  27 March 2020 authorizing the King to take measures in the fight against 
the spread of  the COVID-19 coronavirus, available here: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/
wet/2020/03/27/2020040937/justel (I) and here: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/wet/2020 
/03/27/2020040938/justel (II).
15  Advice of  the Council of  State of  25 March 2020 concerning a bill delegating pow-
ers to the King to fight the spread of  the coronavirus Covid-19, available here: http://www.
raadvst-consetat.be/dbx/adviezen/67142.pdf.
16  The report of  its first meeting is available here: https://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/
pdf/55/ic145.pdf. Note that the functioning of  the parliaments during the crisis was a matter 
of  constitutional attention, too. For example, the federal Parliament amended its rules and 
procedures to enable electronic (distance) voting. Even during plenary sessions, only a small 
number of  MPs was allowed in the hemicycle.
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secure substantial room for maneuvering. If  Parliament’s role had been lim-
ited to merely approve the Cabinet’s proposed legislative measures without 
a meaningful debate, the added democratic value of  following the normal 
legislative process would have been limited in any case.
IV. FederAlisM: consultAtion 
And coordinAtion
Belgium is a federal country. Although the initial response to the COVID-19 
crisis had a federal origin, this was not the case for many of  the follow-
ing (socio-economic) measures. The complex distribution of  competences, 
which under normal circumstances regularly gives cause for debate and 
litigation, now lead to some confusion and coordination problems. Belgian 
federalism is based on the idea of  exclusivity and the absence of  hierarchy, 
meaning that in principle, only one level of  government can be competent 
to adopt a specific policy measure. In practice, this ideal has been nuanced, 
among other things, by the fact that many general policy areas are shared 
exclusive, meaning that some parts are taken care of  by the federal govern-
ment and others by the federated entities (in this case, the Communities). 
Notably, regarding health care, the federal government is competent for 
public health (including hospitals), but the Communities are responsible 
for other care institutions (including elderly homes) and a number of  other 
aspects of  healthy policy (including prevention).17 At the same time, the 
federal government remains competent for civil security and, more gen-
erally, for maintaining public order. This has enabled it to take measures 
which deeply impact matters that are, by themselves, community turf. For 
example, the Minister of  the Interior ordered the schools to close, even if  
education is not a federal matter. Interestingly, however, he adopted such 
confinement measures based upon the conclusions of  the National Security 
Council, where consultation had taken place with the governments of  the 
federated entities. Under normal circumstances, consultation or coopera-
tion between the different levels of  the federal state is not spontaneous, but 
dependent on complicated rules.
Despite all efforts to consult, the distribution of  competences itself, 
which some claim is overly complicated, was also a source of  problems. On 
17  See article 5, § 1, I of  the special law on the reform of  the institutions, available here: 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/wet/1980/08/08/1980080801/justel. The ‘special’ in ‘spe-
cial law’ refers to a supermajority requirement and is not to be confused with special powers 
legislation as discussed above.
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the one hand, coordination was an issue. For example, it appears that con-
siderable time was lost in determining which level would purchase medical 
mouth masks and for whom. On the other, sometimes it appeared more 
fundamentally obscure which level of  government was competent to adopt 
certain measures. For example, the development of  a tracing system at the 
federal level was stalled after criticism by the Council of  State, which con-
sidered that also to be a matter for the Communities.18 At the height of  
the pandemic, some pleaded for a simplification of  the federal structure, 
although there was no consensus whether that would mean concentrating 
powers back on the federal level or allocating them all to the Communities. 
In a way, those discussions reflected the pre-existing debate about the direc-
tion Belgian federalism should take.
V. conclusion
The constitutional questions the COVID-19 crisis sparked in Belgium are 
similar to what we have seen in other countries: the concerns are about fun-
damental rights, democratic control and, where applicable, the efficiency of  
federalism. During the crisis, some regrettable features of  the Belgian political 
system, which reflect on the constitutional architecture, were however over-
exposed: unstable federal politics, the dominance of  the executive branch 
and the political parties, an all too complicated competence distribution.
On the federal level, a parliamentary committee has been tasked to ex-
amine the way government(s) took care of  the COVID-19 crisis. It will fo-
cus on preparation, financing of  the health care sector, communication, 
coordination, and other issues.19 How governments performed is subject to 
disagreement, and it was also a matter of  debate whether this commission 
should have been granted special investigative powers. That would have al-
lowed it to proceed with quasi-judicial competences. Whatever the need for 
those, hopefully its conclusions will help the country to prepare for future 
challenges.
18  As reported for example here: https://www.hln.be/de-krant/raad-van-state-stuurt-ook-lance 
ring-tracing-app-in-de-war~a8be092e/.
19  See the press release by Parliament of  10 July 2020, available here: https://www.deka 
mer.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/news/0000012309/20200710_covid19-comm.pdf.
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